Dr. Tully and Professor Stockdale (hereinafter referred to as "the FSR") query why I do not advocate that content experts be required for general comparisons \[[@bib1]\]. The FSR states "There are many objects within CCTV footage where failure to have specialist knowledge of the similarities and dissimilarities and their significance would render an imagery expert no more qualified than the jury to give an opinion on the meaning of a comparison." Respectfully, it is incorrect to suggest that a properly trained and qualified imagery expert would bring nothing to the table that would be of value to a jury. In our search for the truth, we must give the jury expert assistance. Where the FSR and I differ is what kind of assistance should be provided.

The FSR cites examples of cases wherein imagery experts have made errors and have followed incorrect methodology. Those cases showcase the need for proper training and certification, one of the central tenets of my original critique of the FSR's approach to image comparison evidence. A decision to ban such evidence outright is premature and unnecessary.

The FSR advocates that an imagery expert should engage in a qualitative assessment about which of the two stated comparison probabilities is more likely, while at the same time acknowledging that a quantitative assessment is not feasible, as is the case in many forensic comparison disciplines. She advocates proficiency testing to ensure that the comparisons are robust and defensible. With all of this, we find agreement. Her further statement that without specific content expertise, the expert is unable to provide a balanced evaluation is where we diverge.

I agree that an expert is obliged to disclose any limitations to their evidence and their expertise, including lack of content expertise. I advocate nothing less. Conversely, the FSR posits that an imagery expert should never be allowed to provide a comparison opinion on any subject matter in which he/she is not also an expert in the subject matter being compared. It is this proposition that is at the heart of our disagreement. To be clear, it would be preferable that an imagery expert also have subject matter expertise. I take no issue with that. In an ideal world, that would always be the case. However, in the real world, imagery experts cannot possibly be cross-trained on every conceivable thing that might require a comparative evaluation. We do not and will not have the luxury of hundreds of specific content experts (one for each make and model of vehicle for example) who are also trained in imagery science. The proposed solution of having an expert in imagery and an expert in subject matter is not a workable solution because the subject matter expert has no forensic training on how to conduct a scientifically valid comparison. It is not simply a matching exercise.

By following the FSR's approach on general comparisons, both the judge and the jury will be denied meaningful assistance in doing something they have no training to do. It is the very function of an expert to educate the court in matters for which they require assistance and it is this assistance that properly trained and qualified imagery experts must provide. Rather than espousing a panacea approach with no latitude for real world practicalities, it is far preferable to allow for general comparisons by qualified imagery experts, while not abandoning the desire for content experts. In cases where the imagery expert is not also an expert in the subject matter being compared, this shall remain a question of weight to be decided by the court, not the FSR. The assessment of weight has been within the province of the court since the advent of the common law. Given the practical problems outlined above, the FSR effectively advocates that no assistance shall be provided to the court on general comparisons beyond commenting on technical image issues. That will do little in assisting the court in its search for the truth.
